unbound

In NLnet Labs Unbound 1.22.0 up to and including 1.25.1, client terminated DNS-over-QUIC (DoQ) queries are not accounted properly by Unbound resulting in low-cost inflation of the waiting number of replies for already in-flight resolution queries. This results in degradation of resolution service for new clients for already in-flight queries. A malicious actor can exploit the vulnerability by issuing DoQ queries for query names that need resolution and proceeding on immediately terminating the query by one of STOP_SENDING/RESET_STREAM/CONNECTION_CLOSE QUIC frames. Those terminated DoQ queries are not properly counted for and keep inflating the number of waiting replies for in-flight queries. When the maximum is reached, it results in silent query drops for new clients needing resolution for already in-flight queries. This vulnerability needs Unbound to be compiled with DoQ support ('--with-libngtcp2') and the 'quic-port' to be configured for the listening interfaces. Additionally, a malicious actor needs access to multiple source IPs to bypass the by-default configured 'wait-limit' option.

NLnet Labs Unbound 1.14.0 up to and including version 1.25.0 has a locking inconsistency vulnerability that when certain conditions are met (multi-threaded, RPZ XFR reload, RPZ zone with 'rpz-nsip'/'rpz-nsdname' triggers) it could result in heap use-after-free and eventual crash. An adversary can exploit the vulnerability if conditions are first met on a vulnerable Unbound, i.e., multi-threaded, an RPZ zone with 'rpz-nsip'/'rpz-nsdname' triggers and an ongoing XFR for that RPZ zone. Local RPZ files do not trigger the vulnerability. If the timing is right and an XFR happens at the same time another thread needs to read that RPZ zone, the reader may not hold the lock long enough and the thread applying the XFR may free objects that the reader is about to walk causing the use-after-free. Unbound 1.25.1 contains a patch with a fix to the locking code.

NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.0 has a vulnerability when handling replies with very large RRsets that Unbound needs to perform name compression for. Malicious upstream responses with very large RRsets with records that don't share a suffix above the root can cause Unbound to spend a considerable time applying name compression to downstream replies. This can lead to degraded performance and eventually denial of service in well orchestrated attacks. An adversary can exploit the vulnerability by querying Unbound for the specially crafted contents of a malicious zone with very large RRsets. Before Unbound replies to the query it will try to apply name compression which was an unbounded operation that could lock the CPU until the whole packet was complete. A compression limit was introduced in 1.21.1 for this but it didn't account for the case where records would not share any suffix above the root. That causes Unbound to go in a different code path because of the compression tree lookup failure and eventually not increment the compression counter for those operations. Unbound 1.25.1 contains a patch with a fix that increments the compression counter regardless of the compression tree lookup. This is a complement fix to CVE-2024-8508.

NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.0 is vulnerable to poisoning via promiscuous records for the authority section. Promiscuous RRSets that complement DNS replies in the authority section can be used to trick Unbound to cache such records. If an adversary is able to attach such records in a reply (i.e., spoofed packet, fragmentation attack) he would be able to poison Unbound's cache. A malicious actor can exploit the possible poisonous effect by injecting RRSets other than NS that are also accompanied by address records in a reply, for example MX. This could be achieved by trying to spoof a reply packet or fragmentation attacks. Unbound would then accept the relative address records in the additional section and cache them if the authority RRSet has enough trust at this point, i.e., in-zone data for the delegation point. Unbound 1.25.1 contains a patch with a fix that disregards address records from the additional section if they are not explicitly relevant only to authority NS records, mitigating the possible poison effect. This is a complement fix to CVE-2025-11411.

NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.0 has a vulnerability in the DNSSEC validator where the code path to consult the negative cache for DS records does not take into account the limit on NSEC3 hash calculations introduced in 1.19.1. This leads to degradation of service during the attack. An adversary that controls a DNSSEC signed zone can exploit this by signing NSEC3 records with acceptably high iterations for child delegations and querying a vulnerable Unbound. Unbound will keep performing the allowed hash calculations on the NSEC3 records and will not limit the work by the mitigation introduced in 1.19.1. As a side effect, a global lock for the negative cache will be held for the duration of the hashing, blocking other threads that need to consult the negative cache. Coordinated attacks could raise the vulnerability to denial of service. Unbound 1.25.1 contains a patch with a fix to bound the vulnerable code path with the existing limit for NSEC3 hash calculations.

NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.0 has a vulnerability in the jostle logic that could defeat its purpose and degrade resolution performance. Retransmits of the same query could renew the age of slow running queries and not allow the jostle logic to see them as aged and potential targets for replacement with new queries. An adversary who can query a vulnerable Unbound and who can control a domain name server that replies slowly and/or maliciously to Unbound's queries can exploit the vulnerability and degrade the resolution performance of Unbound. When Unbound's 'num-queries-per-thread' reaches its limit, the jostle logic kicks in. When a new query comes in, half of the available queries that are also slow to resolve are candidates for replacement. The vulnerability then happens because duplicate queries that need resolution would skew the aging result by using the timestamp of the latest duplicate query instead of the original one that started the resolution effort. Cache and local data response performance remains unaffected. Coordinated attacks could raise this to a denial of resolution service. Unbound 1.25.1 contains a patch with a fix to attach an initial, non-updatable start time for incoming queries that allow the jostle logic to work as intended.