Keystone is a content management system for Node.js. Prior to version 6.5.0, `{field}.isFilterable` access control can be bypassed in `update` and `delete` mutations by adding additional unique filters. These filters can be used as an oracle to probe the existence or value of otherwise unreadable fields. Specifically, when a mutation includes a `where` clause with multiple unique filters (e.g. `id` and `email`), Keystone will attempt to match records even if filtering by the latter fields would normally be rejected by `field.isFilterable` or `list.defaultIsFilterable`. This can allow malicious actors to infer the presence of a particular field value when a filter is successful in returning a result. This affects any project relying on the default or dynamic `isFilterable` behavior (at the list or field level) to prevent external users from using the filtering of fields as a discovery mechanism. While this access control is respected during `findMany` operations, it was not completely enforced during `update` and `delete` mutations when accepting more than one unique `where` values in filters. This has no impact on projects using `isFilterable: false` or `defaultIsFilterable: false` for sensitive fields, or for those who have otherwise omitted filtering by these fields from their GraphQL schema. This issue has been patched in `@keystone-6/core` version 6.5.0. To mitigate this issue in older versions where patching is not a viable pathway, set `isFilterable: false` statically for relevant fields to prevent filtering by them earlier in the access control pipeline (that is, don't use functions); set `{field}.graphql.omit.read: true` for relevant fields, which implicitly removes filtering by these fields from the GraphQL schema; and/or deny `update` and `delete` operations for the relevant lists completely.
keystone
Vendor: keystone-engine
Security Vulnerability Index
Page 1 / 1Keystone is an open source headless CMS for Node.js — built with GraphQL and React. When `ui.isAccessAllowed` is set as `undefined`, the `adminMeta` GraphQL query is publicly accessible (no session required). This is different to the behaviour of the default AdminUI middleware, which by default will only be publicly accessible (no session required) if a `session` strategy is not defined. This vulnerability does not affect developers using the `@keystone-6/auth` package, or any users that have written their own `ui.isAccessAllowed` (that is to say, `isAccessAllowed` is not `undefined`). This vulnerability does affect users who believed that their `session` strategy will, by default, enforce that `adminMeta` is inaccessible by the public in accordance with that strategy; akin to the behaviour of the AdminUI middleware. This vulnerability has been patched in `@keystone-6/core` version `5.5.1`. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may opt to write their own `isAccessAllowed` functionality to work-around this vulnerability.
Keystone is a content management system for Node.JS. There is an open redirect in the `@keystone-6/auth` package versions 7.0.0 and prior, where the redirect leading `/` filter can be bypassed. Users may be redirected to domains other than the relative host, thereby it might be used by attackers to re-direct users to an unexpected location. To mitigate this issue, one may apply a patch from pull request 8626 or avoid using the `@keystone-6/auth` package.
Keystone is a headless CMS for Node.js — built with GraphQL and React.`@keystone-6/[email protected] || 3.0.1` users that use `NODE_ENV` to trigger security-sensitive functionality in their production builds are vulnerable to `NODE_ENV` being inlined to `"development"` for user code, irrespective of what your environment variables. If you do not use `NODE_ENV` in your user code to trigger security-sensitive functionality, you are not impacted by this vulnerability. Any dependencies that use `NODE_ENV` to trigger particular behaviors (optimizations, security or otherwise) should still respect your environment's configured `NODE_ENV` variable. The application's dependencies, as found in `node_modules` (including `@keystone-6/core`), are typically not compiled as part of this process, and thus should be unaffected. We have tested this assumption by verifying that `NODE_ENV=production yarn keystone start` still uses secure cookies when using `statelessSessions`. This vulnerability has been fixed in @keystone-6/[email protected], regression tests have been added for this vulnerability in #8063.
@keystone-6/core is a core package for Keystone 6, a content management system for Node.js. Starting with version 2.2.0 and prior to version 2.3.1, users who expected their `multiselect` fields to use the field-level access control - if configured - are vulnerable to their field-level access control not being used. List-level access control is not affected. Field-level access control for fields other than `multiselect` are not affected. Version 2.3.1 contains a fix for this issue. As a workaround, stop using the `multiselect` field.
A flaw was found in Keystone. There is a time lag (up to one hour in a default configuration) between when security policy says a token should be revoked from when it is actually revoked. This could allow a remote administrator to secretly maintain access for longer than expected.
A flaw was found in openstack-keystone. Only the first 72 characters of an application secret are verified allowing attackers bypass some password complexity which administrators may be counting on. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity.
An arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the file upload module of Keystone v4.2.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted file.
keystone is vulnerable to Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
OpenStack Keystone 10.x through 16.x before 16.0.2, 17.x before 17.0.1, 18.x before 18.0.1, and 19.x before 19.0.1 allows information disclosure during account locking (related to PCI DSS features). By guessing the name of an account and failing to authenticate multiple times, any unauthenticated actor could both confirm the account exists and obtain that account's corresponding UUID, which might be leveraged for other unrelated attacks. All deployments enabling security_compliance.lockout_failure_attempts are affected.