Vendor: acer
Fixed AES-128-CBC keys inside the AcerConnect OTA application let attackers forge authorization credentials for arbitrary IMEI numbers. This allows unauthorized actors to list catalog items and extract protected binaries from pre-signed cloud links.
The registration path /v1/account/register provides no bot mitigation mechanisms, allowing malicious automated systems to flood the database.
The web administration panel binds broadly to the public IPv6 address space on port [::]:8080 without default firewall limits, making internal API endpoints reachable over the WAN.
The /v1/Plan service relies entirely on a shared global API token for full administrative management, allowing arbitrary creation of zero-cost network access plans.
The account validation endpoint /v1/User/validate returns comprehensive user profile data sheets, which can be crawled by iterating predictable identification strings.
Weak validation logic within device dissociation API routines allows a remote entity to forcefully unbind unrelated user endpoints, causing severe denial of service.
Leftover engineering diagnostics and factory-level diagnostic software remain exposed on retail builds, giving malicious apps write privileges to internal NVRAM registers.
The device encrypts data using AES-CBC with static zero-filled Initialization Vectors (IVs), making it susceptible to replay attacks and known-plaintext decryption.
Broadcast events allow malicious software to rewrite the device's default Mobile Device Management (MDM) endpoint address, shifting administrative ownership to an external attacker.
High-risk TrustAllCerts routines disable standard TLS certificate validation. Combined with hard-coded DES symmetric encryption keys, a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) actor could decrypt network traffic.