keycloak

A flaw was found in Keycloak’s WebAuthn registration component. This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass the configured attestation policy and register untrusted or forged authenticators via submission of an attestation object with fmt: "none", even when the realm is configured to require direct attestation. This can lead to weakened authentication integrity and unauthorized authenticator registration.

A flaw was found in Keycloak. An administrator with `manage-users` permission can bypass the "Only administrators can view" setting for unmanaged attributes, allowing them to modify these attributes. This improper access control can lead to unauthorized changes to user profiles, even when the system is configured to restrict such modifications.

A vulnerability was found in Keycloak-services. Special characters used during e-mail registration may perform SMTP Injection and unexpectedly send short unwanted e-mails. The email is limited to 64 characters (limited local part of the email), so the attack is limited to very shorts emails (subject and little data, the example is 60 chars). This flaw's only direct consequence is an unsolicited email being sent from the Keycloak server. However, this action could be a precursor for more sophisticated attacks.

A vulnerability has been identified in Keycloak that could lead to unauthorized information disclosure. While it requires an already authenticated user, the /admin/serverinfo endpoint can inadvertently provide sensitive environment information.

An open redirect vulnerability was found in Keycloak. A specially crafted URL can be constructed where the referrer and referrer_uri parameters are made to trick a user to visit a malicious webpage. A trusted URL can trick users and automation into believing that the URL is safe, when, in fact, it redirects to a malicious server. This issue can result in a victim inadvertently trusting the destination of the redirect, potentially leading to a successful phishing attack or other types of attacks. Once a crafted URL is made, it can be sent to a Keycloak admin via email for example. This will trigger this vulnerability when the user visits the page and clicks the link. A malicious actor can use this to target users they know are Keycloak admins for further attacks. It may also be possible to bypass other domain-related security checks, such as supplying this as a OAuth redirect uri. The malicious actor can further obfuscate the redirect_uri using URL encoding, to hide the text of the actual malicious website domain.

A vulnerability was found in Keycloak. This flaw allows attackers to bypass brute force protection by exploiting the timing of login attempts. By initiating multiple login requests simultaneously, attackers can exceed the configured limits for failed attempts before the system locks them out. This timing loophole enables attackers to make more guesses at passwords than intended, potentially compromising account security on affected systems.